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Abstract 
In most currency crises, it is not uncommon to see countries with problem 
getting financial supports from other countries. Why countries are interested in 
rescuing other countries from the viewpoint of economics? 
This paper tries to explain the financial aid with a simple two-country model. 
Consider two central banks compete for export sales to an external market, each 
facing a symmetric social loss function comprising output stability and price-level 
stability. Since export affects output, the social loss of a central bank is inevitably 
affected by another central bank's exchange rate policy. Such relationship, in turn 
becomes a motivation for a central bank to provide financial aid to intervene another 
central bank's exchange rate policy decision. 
Realignment cost, the fixed cost incurred in abandoning fixed exchange rate 
policy, is a key determinant of the financial aid. Even though high realignment 
cost seems to provide greater motivation for a central bank to defend another 
country's fixed exchange rate in order to maintain its own, this paper reveals that 
greatest amount of financial aid is provided by a central bank with intermediate 
instead of high realignment cost. 
Some special features of the model are also discussed in the paper. They 
include the effect of the threat of competitive devaluations in sustaining the 
exchange rate policy cooperation, the non-monotonic relationship between output 
sensitivity to the depreciation rate/adjusted inflation-output stability preference and 
policy response and how speculators can force a central bank to abandon its fixed 
exchange rate policy indirectly through its export competitor. 
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1. Introduction 
Global economy has been enjoying satisfactory growth in the past few years. 
Countries with fixed exchange rate are building up reserves and currency crisis 
seems to be a far away scenario. From the past experience, however, it is clear that 
currency crises keep repeating in the history, from the downfall of Bretton Woods 
system in 1971 to the recent Asian financial crisis in 1997. 
Currency crises can have great, if not huge, destructive impact on the domestic 
as well as global economy. Currency crises usually come with debt crises, bank 
runs, substantial capital outflow and recession. Countries may take several years to 
recover from it and their trends of economic growth can be permanently below their 
pre-crisis level、 
Currency crises have been studied both theoretically and empirically. 
Empirical data are tested to identify symptoms of a currency crisis and develop early 
warning system. On the theoretical side, currency crises models are basically 
classified into two types, one based on economic fundamentals while another is 
self-fulfilling. The first-generation model introduced by Krugman (1979) put the 
causes of crises on weak economic fundamentals and inconsistent macroeconomic 
policies. Later models pioneered by Obstfeld (1994) argued that exchange rate 
policy is a tool to minimize social loss and attributed crises to the change of 
investors' expectation. 
1 See Hong and Tomell, 2003, "Recovery from a currency crisis: some stylized facts", Journal of 
Development Economics 76, 71-96 
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Traditional theories mostly focus on stand-alone currency crises. In the real 
world, however, currency crises are usually contagious. In the Asian crisis, 
currencies of other countries in the region such as Malaysia, Philippines collapsed 
shortly after the fall of Thai baht. EMS crisis, Latin American currency crisis and 
many other currency crises in history showed this similar feature. 
Modeling a country's exchange rate policy decision as social loss minimization 
sheds light on the explanation of contagious currency crisis. Kasa and Huh (2001) 
interrelated costs of maintaining the fixed exchange rate of different central banks 
through export competition. For a group of export competing countries, 
devaluation of a currency weakens the competitiveness of other countries' export 
and thus increases the costs of maintaining fixed exchanges rates for other central 
banks. 
Kasa and Huh (2001) have an interesting implication. As devaluation of 
foreign currency increases the costs for domestic central bank, it is clear that 
domestic central bank should have an intention to prevent it from happening. One 
of the ways is to provide financial aid to assist foreign central bank to defend its 
currency. In fact, financial aid is not uncommon in currency crises. During Asian 
Financial Crisis, Hong Kong joined several countries in Asia and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) to provide a US$ 16 billion financial aid to Thailand, the first 
country under speculative attack in the crisis. 
2 
Most existing studies of currency crisis focus on the cause of currency crisis and 
equilibrium of a country's exchange rate regime under speculative attack .^ This 
paper, on the other hand, tries to study and explain financial aid in currency crises. 
This paper basically follows the framework of Kasa and Huh (2001) to develop a 
game for the interaction of two central bank's exchange rate policy. Based on the 
game, this paper further explains and illustrates how financial aid can be used as a 
tool to minimize social loss of central banks. 
A central bank's decision to abandon its fixed exchange rate policy has negative 
impact on another central bank. To the extreme, the other central bank may be 
forced to abandon its fixed exchange rate policy as well, thus lead to competitive 
devaluations between two central banks. Intuitively, a central bank involves high 
fixed cost (i.e. realignment cost) in abandoning its fixed exchange rate policy should 
be willing to provide more financial aid to another central bank. However, this 
paper reveals that a central bank with high realignment cost may actually offer less 
financial aid. It is because realignment cost of a central bank has two effects on the 
financial aid decision. Firstly, it increases with the social loss of a central bank in 
abandoning the fixed exchange rate policy which motivates a central bank to provide 
more financial aid. Secondly, higher realignment cost reduces the likelihood of an 
abandonment decision, restraining the amount of financial aid that a central bank is 
willing to provide. At certain threshold, further increase in realignment cost will 
reduce a central bank's motivation to provide financial aid. 
Rest of the paper is organized as follows. Existing currency crises models are 
reviewed in the next section. The basic model setup and payoff are introduced in 
2 See, for example, Morris ad Shin (1998) and Angeletos et al (2006). 
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the following section. Based on the model, two-stage game is developed to discuss 
the interaction of two central bank's exchange rate policies and important features of 
the model in such game. Finally, the game is further extended to explain the 
financial aid decision. 
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2. Literature Reviews 
2.1. Economic Fundamentals Models 
The first-generation model, founded by Krugman (1979) and further illustrated 
by Flood and Garber (1984) suggests that currency crises are caused by inconsistent 
macroeconomic policies, that is a fixed exchange rate regime and expansionary 
monetary policy. 
The main idea of first-generation model can be presented in a simplified 
scenario. In a small open economy, purchasing power parity and uncovered 
interest parity hold and investors have perfect foresight. Government reserve is 
composed of two assets, domestic and foreign currency. Government is running 
fiscal deficit, which is financed by increasing domestic currency supply. Under a 
fixed exchange rate regime without any capital control, government must stand 
ready to provide foreign currency at a fixed rate. Therefore, any increase in 
domestic currency supply in excess of its demand is converted into foreign currency 
by domestic residents. It is clear that a fiscal deficit financed by printing domestic 
currency will results in losing of foreign currency reserves under a fixed exchange 
rate regime. The foreign currency reserve will be exhausted by continuous deficit 
and the government is then forced to float its currency. 
The transition of exchange rate from fixed to flexible is not smooth. Instead, 
there will be a discrete jump in exchange rate at the exhaustion of foreign currency 
reserve. Such discrete jump means unlimited profit for investors, which should not 
happen under prefect foresight. Therefore, the fixed exchange rate does not 
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collapse when the foreign currency reserve is exhausted, but when shadow exchange 
rate (exchange rate if the currency floats immediately) just exceeds the fixed rate. 
At this point, investors will acquire the rest of foreign currency reserve from the 
government, force the currency to float and make profit from the difference between 
two rates. Investors, or often named as speculators by countries under attack, play 
an important role in currency crises. 
It is not difficult to realize that the first-generation model is actually an 
application of Mundell's impossible trinity^. Among a fixed exchange rate, free 
capital movement and an independent monetary policy, government can only have 
two, but not all. Under a fixed exchange rate without capital control, it is 
impossible to use monetary policy to finance fiscal deficit. Otherwise, such 
monetary policy will finally lead to a collapse of the fixed exchange rate. 
Using a sample model, it can be shown that an increase in initial reserves or a 
decrease in domestic credit growth or both delay the collapse of fixed rate. When 
government balances its budget or stops financing deficit by increasing money 
supply, domestic credit growth is reduced to zero and crisis can be avoided. All of 
these imply that a currency crisis is predictable, both for its occurrence and timing in 
first-generation model. 
2.2. Self-fulfilling Models 
3 Paul Krugman, " O Canada: A neglected nation gets its Nobe l " , Slate Magaz ine , October 
19, 1999. 
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The first-generation model did work quite well for early crises in 1980s when 
most crises came with irresponsible monetary policy. However, problem came 
when United Kingdom was attacked and exited European Monetary System without 
significant inconsistent monetary policies. Interest rate was first raised to save the 
link but then put away when it became too high, which suggested that United 
Kingdom chose, instead of was forced, to exit from the system. Under such 
backdrop, the second-generation came to researchers' attention. 
The second-generation model, originated in Obstfeld (1986) and further 
illustrated in Obstfeld (1994, 1996) argues that currency crises are self-fulfilled. In 
self-fulfilling model, inadequate economic fundamentals are no more a necessary 
condition for currency crises. 
Sufficient reserve endorses government's ability to defend its fixed exchange 
rate, but not its willingness. In the first-generation model, government is forced to 
abandon fixed exchange rate when foreign currency reserve is exhausted without 
any alternatives. In the second-generation model, on the other hand, abandonment 
of fixed exchange rate is government's voluntary action to minimize social loss. 
Government faces different objectives, including stable exchange rate, inflation, 
employment, etc. A fixed exchange rate reduces social loss by achieving stable 
exchange rate and price level, but loses the opportunity to optimize monetary policy 
to achieve full employment or stimulate output. If difference between actual and 
expected change in exchange rate is positively related to output level"^  (i.e. output 
increases when actual depreciation is larger than expected depreciation), an increase 
4 Self-fulfilled currency crisis can be illustrated with many other social loss functions. The one 
used in the paper is captured from Obstfeld (1996). 
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in depreciation expectation causes an increase in social loss by reducing output 
under fixed exchange rate. Increasing depreciation expectation causes increasing 
social loss of using fixed exchange rate and government chooses to abandon fixed 
exchange rate to minimize social loss at certain threshold. Therefore, expectation 
is realized because of itself or self-fulfilled^. 
Based on the social loss framework which abandonment of fixed exchange rate 
policy is a choice, Chan and Chen (2003) suggested a central bank can use an 
irrevocable commitment policy to defend its fixed exchange rate .^ The idea is simple 
and straight forward, irrevocable commitment increases the abandonment cost of the 
fixed exchange rate (or increases the social loss of flexible exchange rate in a more 
direct way) and thus lowers the expected probability of a currency crisis. 
2.3. Contagious Currency Crises 
Not surprisingly, currency crises are usually contagious. Every time a currency 
crisis happens in one country, it spreads to other countries in the region or with 
similar economic structure. In the Asian crisis, currencies of other countries in the 
region such as Malaysia, Philippines collapsed shortly after the fall of Thai baht. 
Kasa and Huh (2001) argued that contagious currency crises were caused by 
export competition. Contagious currency crises or competitive devaluations are 
again, a voluntarily loss minimization action of countries. In the model, social loss 
5 Self-fulfilling model could be more complicated with multi-equilibria for depreciation expectation. 
So, even a sunspot could shift expectation from one equilibrium to another which cause a change of 
exchange rate policy. 
6 The original exchange rate regime used by Chan and Chen (2003) was currency board. However, 
the idea is also applicable on other hard-fixed exchange rate systems. 
8 
is composed of a deviation of output from "natural" level and price level. The 
actual output depends on relative exchange rate, that is the difference between 
exchange rate of a country and the group average exchange rate, and a common 
shock to the region. The relative exchange rate in the social loss function makes 
currency crisis contagious. Finally, present value of the social loss equals to 
discounted social loss for all periods. 
If central banks can cooperate and commit to an exchange rate policy, the joint 
loss minimizing strategy is setting exchange rates at zero for all countries. The 
one-period social loss for a country is given as L . Similar to monetary authority's 
temptation to increase money supply once inflation expectation is formed, a country 
also temps to deviate from the average exchange rate. With the optimized 
exchange rate (when exchange rates of other countries is fixed at zero), the 
one-period social loss is given as L . The benefit from deviation is therefore L -
L^. Benefit of deviation increases with number of countries in the group (i.e. can 
seize export from a larger number of countries). Thus, cooperation among a larger 
group of countries is more difficult to sustain. 
Once a country devalues its currency, other countries in the group are going to 
response by devaluing theirs in second period. Finally, all countries reach another 
equilibrium with all exchange rates being equal and social loss becomes L^. 
Therefore, a country suffers an increase in social loss from competitive devaluation 
which equals to L^ -LP in long run. 
Decision to deviate from the committed exchange rate or not is a comparison 
C D 
between its benefit in the first period {L - L ) and costs. Such costs include 
9 
present value of 1) loss from competitive devaluation {L^ -LF) if deviation is not 
required in future and 2) loss from loss reduction opportunity (L - L ) if deviation 
is required in future. Based on the benefit and costs, a critical level of negative 
shocks (w*) for devaluation can be found. When negative shocks exceed this 
critical level, there will be simultaneous devaluations for countries in the group . 
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3. The Model 
3.1. Output Stability and Price-level Stability Tradeoff 
The basic setup of the model basically follows the framework of Kasa and Huh 
(2001). Two central banks, facing symmetric tradeoff between output stability and 
price-level stability. In other words, each central bank has following social loss 
function: 
L, 二去(兄一刃2+|凡2, (1) 
where 兄 denotes the log of country z's output, y is the central bank's target level 
of output and s is the central bank's relative preference on price-level stability and 
output stability. The larger the s , the larger the social loss assigned by the central 
bank on price level variability relative to output variability. Inflation rate of 
country i is denoted by 凡. 
An important assumption in the framework of Kasa and Huh (2001) is that 
countries compete for export sales to a common external market. As a result of 
export competition, export of country i are an increasing function of its depreciation 
rate relative to another country (denoted by j). This relationship is captured by the 
following output function?: 
7 The function implies that output of country i's output equals to zero when e, = e 丨.It may make 
not much sense. Such problem can be solved by including a constant term, for example in the 
output function like the one used in Obstfeld (1996), without affecting the findings of this paper. 
Existing output is used for simplicity. 
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兄=oc{e, — e,), (2) 
where and Cj denotes the depreciation rate of country i and j respectively while a 
denotes the sensitivity of country /'s output to the relative depreciation rate. 
The relationship between domestic inflation rate and the depreciation rate is 
assumed to be deterministic as mentioned in Kasa and Huh (2001): 
P丨=Pe丨, (3) 
where P is the sensitivity of country i，s inflation rate to the depreciation rate of its 
currency. Such partial pass-through, as explained in Kasa and Huh (2001), can 
come from an upward-sloping aggregate supply curve or a domestic price index with 
g 
imported goods . 
Substituting equation (2) and (3) into (1) gives the following social loss 
function: 
(4) 
where y is now the central bank's inflation-output stability preference adjusted by 
the degree of pass-through, that is / = P^s. 
8 Please see Appendix 8.1 for details. 
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In a symmetric equilibrium where e, = e ., putting (3) and (4) into (1) and the 
social loss function becomes 
丄 , = 全 歹 ( 5 ) 
It is clear that the joint loss-minimizing policy is to set e^  = e^  =0 or in other 
words, adopt a fixed exchange policy if two central banks can commit to an 
exchange rate policy. Thus, the loss for this cooperative equilibrium is as below: 
Lf 二去, (6) 
Central bank which adopts fixed exchange rate policy, however, forgoes the 
opportunity to minimize its social loss through optimizing its depreciation rate (see 
details in the Appendix) as below: 
e 丨 = 丄 2 ( 7 ) 
a + / 
If a central bank chooses to depreciate its currency unilaterally, it enjoys a 
lower loss than the cooperative equilibrium (see details in the Appendix): 
^=\ A ^ - A . (8) 
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while another central bank keeping the fixed exchange rate policy suffers a higher 
social loss (see details in the Appendix): 
去歹 2[1 + 各 丫 . (9) 
2 [ a +/J 
Temptation of a unilateral devaluation may make two central banks fail to 
cooperate when both banks try to stimulate export sales with flexible exchange rate 
policy. The reaction function in (7) means central banks will fall into competitive 
devaluations under flexible exchange rate policy, each central bank chooses a higher 
depreciation rate than its competitor's. At equilibrium where = e), the reaction 
function in (7) provides following equilibrium depreciation rate under competitive 
devaluations (see details in the Appendix): 
= (10) 
7 
resulting in following social loss (see details in the Appendix) 
1 ( 
i + [ . (11) 
2 I r J 
As a short summary, flexible exchange rate policy gives central bank a tool to 
minimize social loss by optimizing depreciation rate. Unfortunately, if both central 
banks adopt flexible exchange rate policy to obtain the optimization benefit, each 
central bank will keep responding to another central bank's depreciation. Two 
14 
central banks will finally fall into the competitive devaluations equilibrium and both 
suffer from a social loss higher than the cooperative equilibrium. 
3.2. Realignment Cost 
Social loss function introduced in previous section mainly focuses the tradeoff 
between output stability and price-level stability as described in the framework of 
Kasa and Huh (2001). Models in other literatures, however, introduce addition 
costs involved in different exchange rate policy other than social loss from output 
variability and price-level variability. Fixed costs involved in adopting the flexible 
exchange rate policy were introduced in various currency crises models such as 
Obstfled (1996), Chan and Chen (2003), etc. Such fixed costs can be due to an 
increase in exchange rate volatility, loss of credibility on previous fixed exchange 
rate commitment, etc. The fixed costs are summarized as a country-specific 
realignment cost, Q in this model. The realignment cost, Q is incorporated in the 
social loss function for unilaterally devaluation, (8) and competitive devaluations, 
(11) as below: 
^ (12) 
丄 丨 + 斗 c" (13) 
2 I r J 
3.3. Speculative Attack and Its Size 
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In an economy without capital control, a central bank with fixed exchange rate 
policy is obligated to convert domestic currency into foreign currency upon request 
at the specified exchange rate. In this sense, a speculative attack on the fixed 
exchange rate results in a significant outflow of foreign reserves and become an 
additional cost in defending the fixed exchange rate policy. In Morris and Shin 
(1998) and Angeletos et al (2006), the cost of defending a fixed exchange rate policy 
is an increasing function of the size of speculative attack. 
Speculators are motivated to attack a fixed exchange rate by the potential return 
of its abandonment. In a typical speculative attack, speculators short sell the 
currency at the official fixed exchange rate and will make a profit by settling the 
short position with the depreciated currency when they successfully force the central 
bank to abandon the fixed exchange rate policy. Obviously, the expected 
depreciation rate {Eei) is a key determinant of speculators' return and thus, the size 
of speculative attack, 
S.=S(Ee,). (14) 
The next question is how the expected depreciation rate is determined. The 
expected depreciation rate should be a product of the probability of a successful 
attack (i.e. central bank abandons the fixed exchange rate policy) and the 
depreciation rate of the currency once the fixed exchange rate policy is abandoned. 
Both factors are different under different foreign exchange rate policy (i.e. the 
exchange rate policy of the export competing country). To determine the 
probability of a successful speculative attack, it is assumed that the actual aggregate 
size of the speculative attack is unknown to individual speculator but is believed to 
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be uniformly distributed on [0,S]. Individual speculator depends on the expected 
depreciation rate to make a one-off decision^ to determine their individual attack 
size. Depreciation rate of the currency after a successful speculative attack, on the 
other hand, is determined by (7). Details of the determinants of expected 
depreciation rate under different foreign exchange rate policy are summarized in the 
following table. 
A 
Foreign central bank's policy > S) E{e\S > S) 
1 ( a ^ 
Fixed ^ ^ 歹 
1 f a^ 
Flexible -aO - y 
s {rj 
Table 1 - Expected depreciation rate under different foreign exchange rate policies 
Costs related to a speculative attack on the fixed exchange rate are incorporated 
in (6) and (9) as below: 
Lf (15) 
+ +5；, (16) 
9 Otherwise, size of the speculative attack can be determined with an unknown realignment costs ( Q 
to speculators. Current form of speculative attack size determination is used for simplicity. 
Please refer / and to (17) and (19) respectively 
17 
where S/ and S' are the size of speculative attack on a central bank when another 
central bank adopts fixed and flexible exchange rate policy respectively. Further 
discussion of S/ and S' as well as its implications will come shortly in the next 
section. 
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4. Two-Stage Game for Exchange Rate Policy Decision 
In most currency crises, for example, the recent Asian Financial Crisis, the 
story starts with a group of countries all adopted fixed exchange rate policy. When 
one of the countries was forced to abandon its fixed exchange rate policy by 
speculators, some countries followed the abandonment decision shortly while other 
continued to maintain the fixed exchange rate policy. A scenario of simultaneous 
devaluations illustrated in Kasa and Huh (2001) seldom happened in the history. 
Before talking about the financial aid, exchange rate policy interaction of two 
central banks will be studied first. The basic model setup introduced in the last 
section is incorporated into a two-stage game to see how a foreign and a domestic 
central bank will formulate their exchange rate policy in such game. 
4.1. The Game 
Consider a two-stage game for exchange rate policy formulation. In the first 
stage, foreign central bank decides its exchange rate policy and the domestic central 
bank responses to the foreign central bank's policy in the second stage. The game 
is captured in the following game tree. 
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/ \ 1. Exchange Rate 
Fixed Flexible Policy of the Foreign 
\ Central Bank 
/ \ / \ 2. Exchange Rate 
/ \ / \ Policy of the 
Fixed / flexible Fixed/ flexible 
/ \ / \ Domestic Central 
Bank 
Figure 1 - Two-country game for exchange rate policy decision 
The story begins with a cooperative equilibrium where two central banks both 
adopt the fixed exchange rate policy, without any speculative attack {S^O). From 
(12) and (15), a necessary condition for domestic central bank to attain the 
cooperative equilibrium is that its realignment cost must be larger than the 
optimization benefit under a foreign fixed exchange rate policy, 
1 ( a^ ^ 
C 一 > 入丨 where . (17) 
2 l^a + r j 
4.1.1. Policy Response of the Domestic Central Bank 
Next, speculators attack the fixed exchange rate policy of the foreign central 
bank. The foreign central bank is forced to abandon its fixed exchange rate policy 
when the size of speculative attack is large enough to make the foreign central bank 
involves larger social loss in maintaining the fixed exchange rate policy than 
abandoning it. Response of the domestic central bank to the change of the foreign 
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central bank's exchange rate policy depends on the domestic central bank's 
realignment cost. Speculative attack can be repeated, which means the domestic 
central bank's fixed exchange rate can become speculators' next target. From (13) 
and (16), the domestic central bank will maintain its fixed exchange rate policy only 
if its realignment cost is sufficient large to offset the speculative attack pressure and 
optimization benefit, given with a foreign flexible exchange rate policy (i.e. ^^and 
义〜Otherwise, the domestic central bank will choose to follow the foreign central 
bank to abandon the fixed exchange rate and a contagious currency crisis will be 
observed in such case. Policy responses of the domestic central bank to a change 
of foreign exchange rate policy are summarized as follow: 
flexible exchnage rate policy (for C . < X^ ) 
Domestic policy choosej Domestic u , Q g ) 
fixed exchange rate policy (for C d 。脈 ^ t i c ~ ^ + ^ D ) 
where 
f 2 f 2、 
义/ 制 - l + “ - . (19) 
[I « I ^ ) 
4.1.2. Policy Decision of the Foreign Central Bank 
Policy response of the domestic central bank in (18) in turn affects the 
exchange rate policy decision of the foreign central bank. In the two-stage game 
illustrated in Figure 1, social loss of the foreign central bank to abandon the fixed 
exchange rate policy depends on the domestic central bank's policy response. If 
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the domestic central bank will keep its fixed exchange rate policy anyway, the social 
loss of the foreign central bank will be (12). If the foreign central bank's 
abandonment will be followed by the domestic central bank, the social loss of the 
foreign central bank will be (13). The minimum size of speculative attack which is 
required to make the foreign central bank to deviate from the cooperative 
equilibrium (denoted by ) under different domestic central bank's policy 
responses can be obtained from the social loss difference between (15) and (12), (15) 
and (13) respectively. The amount of 台 f is captured in (20). Clearly, is 
F F 
higher when the domestic central bank threatens to use the competitive devaluations 
strategy (i.e. abandoning the fixed exchange rate policy when the foreign central 
bank abandons its fixed exchange rate policy). 
‘ 2 
. r C 厂 . + — ( f o r C ^ " < 人 1 
^J ^ I Foreign 2y Domestic D . ( 2 � ) 
C 厂 • ( f o r C ^ > 2 ' +S[^、 
Foreign Domestic D 
4.2. Special Features of the Game 
The model has two important features. Firstly, impact of the output sensitivity 
to the depreciation rate (a) and the adjusted inflation-output stability preference (y) 
on the domestic central bank's policy response is non-monotonic. Such feature 
implies that collapse of one country's fixed exchange rate is more likely to result in 
competitive devaluations with intermediate parameters. Secondly, a central bank 
which is able to defend its fixed exchange rate policy from speculative attack at the 
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cooperative equilibrium may fail to do so when speculators first attack the “weakest 
link". 
4.2.1. Export Sensitivity, Adjusted Inflation-Output Stability Preference and Policy 
Response 
From (18) and (19), it is not difficult to see that a and y are important 
determinants of the domestic central bank's policy response through their impacts 
on the optimization benefit (义）and the size of speculative attack To 
analyze their relationship with policy response of the domestic central bank, let a/y 
be (p and thus described in (19) can be rewritten as: 
(21) 
2 I J 
where 0 < ^ < go. 
Intuitively, social loss of the domestic central bank at competitive devaluations 
(the second part of (21) or 0.5y^(l + (p)) increases proportionally with cp while social 
loss of maintaining a fixed exchange rate under a foreign flexible exchange rate 
policy (the first part of (21)) increases with a decreasing rate. Analytical study 
shows that the optimization benefit maximize when (p equals to 0.675 (see details in 
the Appendix). Relationship between 又丨 and (p is presented graphically in Figure 
4 which clearly shows that A! is a non-monotonic function of (p. 
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？! (in term o f 0.5歹 
八 
0.675 1.62 
Figure 2 - Relationship between A! and cp 
Turning to the size of speculative attack Table 1 shows that probability 
A / 
of de-link ( ?Y{S > S)) depends directly on the optimization benefit (A ). So, 
non-monotonic relationship between A! and (p also implies that the probability of 
de-link is a non-monotonic function of (p. The expected depreciation rate under 
/V 
foreign flexible policy (E{e | > ), on the other hand, is simply an increasing 
function of (p. Thus, it is possible to exist multiple critical values for competitive 
devaluations (i.e. 
An example for multiple critical values for competitive devaluations is given in 
Figure 3. According to the numerical example, the domestic central bank will 
maintain its fixed exchange rate policy when (p < 1.04 and (p > 14.65 while it will 
follow the foreign central bank to abandon the fixed exchange rate policy when 1.04 
< (p < 14.65. Intuitively, a low output sensitivity makes the domestic central bank 
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suffers less from the abandonment of the foreign central bank's fixed exchange rate 
policy such reduces the benefit of competitive devaluations. On the other hand, a 
high output sensitivity results in significant increase in the social loss of competitive 
devaluations. Therefore, the domestic central bank will prefer to maintain its fixed 
exchange rate policy when the foreign fixed exchange rate falls due to the threat of 
competitive devaluations. 
0.8 
0 . 5 _ - - ！ - _ 
Figure 3 - An example for multiple critical levels for exchange rate policy response 
y"- = 0 . 1 , 5 ^ - 2 , 5 ' = 2 * E e 
4.2.2. Speculative Attack through the “Weakest Link" 
According to the model, a central bank which cannot be forced to abandon its 
fixed exchange rate policy by speculators directly can be forced to do so after 
speculators successfully forced another currency to de-link. At the cooperative 
2 5 
equilibrium, the minimum size of speculative attack required to force the domestic 
central bank to deviate from the cooperative equilibrium (denoted by 左《）is: 
台 f 二 C - X^ (22) 
D Domestic 、 ) 
Once the foreign central bank floats its currency, the minimum size of 
speculative attack which is required to make domestic central bank to abandon its 
fixed exchange rate policy (denoted by is: 
台 I — c ^ /no \ 
D Domestic 、 ) 
Note that the optimization benefit is always larger when foreign exchange rate 
policy is fixed (i.e. )!〉)1) (see details in the Appendix). Such a result comes from 
the threat of competitive devaluation which increases a central bank's social loss 
significantly. Thus, the optimization benefit under foreign central bank's flexible 
exchange rate policy reduces and even turns into negative. From (22) and (23), / 
> )! implies that > . Therefore, a constant size of speculative attack (i.e. 
: S^D) means a central bank that can defend its fixed exchange rate policy 
against speculative attack under a foreign fixed exchange rate policy must be able to 
defend it under a foreign flexible exchange rate policy. 
From Table 1, the probability of de-link under a foreign fixed exchange rate 
policy is always higher than or equal to the one under foreign fixed policy as 
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^ D ^ ^ D ' The expected depreciation rate once the currency is de-linked, however, 
is higher when the foreign exchange rate policy is flexible due to competitive 
devaluations. The higher expected depreciation rate in competitive devaluations 
therefore may overweight the lower de-link probability and result in a higher Ee and 
thus, a greater size of speculative attack on the domestic central bank under foreign 
flexible exchange rate policy. It means that it is possible to have 
S-j^ - In other words, a central bank which can not be forced by 
speculative attack to de-link its currency at cooperative equilibrium may be forced to 
do so after fixed exchange rate of its "weaker" export competing central bank (i.e. 
export competing central bank with lower realignment cost) collapsed. 
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5. Financial Aid in Currency Crisis 
With the basic setup of the model and the introduction of a simple game for 
exchange rate policy interaction, this section moves forward to discuss financial aid. 
For simplicity, this section focuses on the relationship between financial aid and 
realignment cost by keeping the output sensitivity and the adjusted inflation-output 
stability preference constant. 
5.1. The Game with Financial Aid 
Assume that two central banks are able to stay at the cooperative equilibrium 
when there is no speculative attack. The domestic central bank has a relative high 
realignment cost and speculators are unable to force it to abandon its fixed exchange 
rate policy from the cooperative equilibrium. The foreign central bank, on the 
other hand, has a relative low realignment cost and will choose to change its 
exchange rate policy from fixed to flexible under speculative attack (denoted by 
SI.). It is shown in (21) that the minimum size of speculative attack required for 
the foreign central bank to deviate from the cooperative is larger under the threat of 
competitive devaluations. To allow different exchange rate policy responses in the 
study, the size of speculative attack is assumed to be sufficient large to force foreign 
central bank to deviate from the cooperative equilibrium regardless of the domestic 
central bank's response. Abovementioned information is summarized in the 
following assumptions. 
ASSUMPTION Al. CDomestic > S丨)+ 入丨 >/ 
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ASSUMPTION A2. S;: - ^ I y ) > Cforeign > / 
The abandonment of foreign central bank's fixed exchange rate policy always 
results in a higher loss for the domestic central bank and therefore the domestic 
central bank has a motivation to intervene the foreign central bank's choice of 
exchange rate policy. 
Lowering the foreign central bank's loss in maintaining fixed exchange rate 
policy by providing financial aid is a possible way. For simplicity, no repayment is 
required for the financial aid, so future value of the repayment can be ignored. The 
financial aid is only provided to the foreign central bank if it agrees to maintain its 
fixed exchange rate policy and the domestic central bank can withdraw the financial 
aid any time if the foreign central bank fails to do so. The withdrawal option is 
important because if financial aid can not be withdrawn once provided, the financial 
aid becomes irrelevant for the foreign bank in deciding its exchange rate policy. 
After foreign central bank decides its foreign exchange rate policy with the optional 
financial aid, domestic bank decides its own policy response. Speculators can shift 
its target from foreign central bank to domestic central bank at any time. So, 
domestic central bank will consider the presence of speculative attack in deciding its 
exchange rate policy response. Under A1 and A2, the game for the currency crisis 
with financial aid is illustrated in Figure 
“P lease see Appendix 8.8 for the complete two-country game tree. 
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1. Speculative Attack on the Foreign 
Central Bank 
2"pfnancral 'Ai'd 
Provide No Decision of the 
F i n a n c i a l A i d / ^ ^ n a n c i a l A i d Domestic Central 
y / Bank 
八 - J ."Foreign 
Accept / NReject and Change Flexible Exchange Rate 
and Keejy \ to Flexible By Policy Decision 
Fixed/ \ 
入 - - 八 - 4.~Dbme"stic 
Fixed / \ / \ Exchange Rate 
Fixed/ \Flexible Fixed/ \Flexible 
By A1 / \ / \ Policy Decision 
Payoff: 
D: Eq.24 Eq. l6 Eq. l3 Eq. l6 Eq. l3 
F: Eq.25 Eq. l2 Eq. l3 Eq. l2 Eq.l3 
Figure 4 - Two-country game with financial aid 
5.2. Stage 4: Policy Response of the Domestic Central Bank 
In response to the change of the foreign exchange rate policy from fixed to 
flexible, policy choice of the domestic central bank is captured in (18) depends on 
realignment cost of the domestic central bank. If the foreign central bank accepts 
the financial aid and maintain its fixed exchange rate policy, the domestic central 
bank must keep its own fixed exchange rate policy according to Assumption 1. 
Even though the financial aid helps reducing social loss of the foreign central 
bank at cooperative equilibrium, it costs the domestic central bank. The financial 
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aid is incorporated in the social loss functions of the foreign and domestic central 
bank as below: 
丄 i 鹏 去 歹 2 + 衫 ( 2 4 ) 
L L ’ = \ f + S [ F ’ (25) 
where F is the log of financial aid. 
5.3. Stage 3: Policy Decision of the Foreign Central Bank 
If the domestic central bank decides not to provide financial aid or the foreign 
central bank rejects the financial aid provided by the domestic central bank, the 
foreign central bank must abandon its fixed exchange rate according to Assumption 
2. Social loss of the foreign central bank will then depends on the domestic central 
bank's policy response. Associate (12) and (13) with the domestic central bank's 
policy responses stated out in (18), social loss of the foreign central bank in 
changing its exchange rate policy is as below 
C^ • + 丄歹2 i + (forCn 
Social loss o f the foreign 1 了 Domestic D 
J V / (IfW 
Foreign Central Bank | \ l i v ^ i i 
C 厂 . + —歹z ( f o r C ^ " 
Foreign ? 2 Domestic D 
On the other hand, the foreign central bank can accept the financial aid 
provided by the domestic central and stay on the cooperative equilibrium. Social 
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loss of the foreign central bank at cooperative equilibrium with compensation from 
the financial aid is as (25). The foreign central bank will only accept the financial 
aid when its loss at the compensated cooperative equilibrium is lower than the one in 
(26), depending on realignment cost of the domestic central bank. Comparing 
social loss of the foreign central bank in (25) and (26), the minimum financial aid 
required to keep foreign central bank at the cooperative equilibrium, Fmm is 
— 〔 2 ) 
s L c . —_歹2 i ( f o r C „ . ) 
toreign 2 y Domestic D 
厂min , 1 广 2 ) . (27) 
s L c • + 丄歹2 _ ( f o r C ^ . 
Foreign ? 2 Domestic D 
Clearly, the threat of competitive devaluations reduces the foreign central 
bank's optimization benefit and thus reduces the minimum financial aid required to 
keep the foreign central bank at the cooperative equilibrium. 
5.4. Stage 2: Financial Aid Decision of the Domestic Central Bank 
Unless the domestic central bank provides the minimum financial aid in (27), 
the foreign central bank will reject the offer of financial aid from the domestic 
central bank. In this case, the domestic central bank is indifference between 
providing "insufficient" financial aid and no financial aid. Associate (13) and (16) 
with the domestic central bank's policy response in (18), social loss of the domestic 
central bank under different scenarios is as below: 
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「 广 ？ 、 
C 1 _2 a I I 
c . ,, Domestic + 2 歹 】+ y (化犷 ^Domestic < 义 + ) 
Social loss o f the ^ i ^ 
Domestic Central Bank f 2 ^ 
1 + - ^ ( f o r c ^ 广 
D 2 2 Domestic D 
I y a +y) 
Although the cooperative equilibrium can be maintained by providing a 
financial aid, the domestic central bank will simply forgo this option if the Fmm 
makes social loss in (24) higher than (28). The maximum financial aid that the 
domestic central bank is willing to provide, Fmax is obtained from the difference 
between (24) and (28): 
广 2 ) 
C n “ — 丄 ( f o r C „ 
Domestic D 2 y Domestic D 
^max , 1 「 r 2 f 1 , , • (29) 
4 ) - 仏 歹 2 1 + ^ — — 1 ( f o r e 臉 她 仏 々 
The maximum financial aid from the domestic central bank is first an 
increasing function of the realignment cost when realignment cost is low and the 
fixed exchange rate policy is not a dominant strategy. At this region, higher 
realignment cost increases the domestic social loss at competitive devaluations while 
decreases the speculative pressure at the original cooperative equilibrium. Once 
realignment cost increases to a critical level which makes fixed exchange rate policy 
a dominant strategy, further increase in the realignment cost continues to reduce 
speculative pressure on the domestic central bank. However, the domestic 
speculative pressure decreases at a faster rate when the foreign central bank adopts a 
flexible rate policy and thus the maximum financial aid becomes a decreasing 
function of the realignment cost. Finally, the realignment cost increases to a level 
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which makes a de-peg decision impossible'^ and maximum financial aid will rest on 
a stable level. Such a pattern has an interesting intuition: financial aid may rescue 
the cooperative equilibrium with intermediate domestic realignment cost, but fails to 
do so with either low or high domestic realignment cost. Such case is illustrated in 
Figure 5. 
八 
Finarcial 一Maximum available financial aid 
A id M i n imum financial aid required 
when Ci^oreign^O 
Z Si- +/). 
Z 0.5歹2 X + a"^ /{a"^+y) —1 
> 
+0.5 歹 2(仅2 / , ) s i , -h A' S+A ' S+A^ ^Domestic 
Figure 5 - An illustration for financial aid. 
a" = = 0.1,玄=2,5^ = 2* 五e 
From the illustrative example, the region with negative financial aid from the 
domestic central bank is actually avoided by the Assumption 1. At the region 
where c , the domestic central bank will follow the foreign central 
Domestic D 
bank to abandon the fixed exchange rate policy and minimum financial aid required 
by the foreign central bank is lower under the threat of competitive devaluations. 
Since the domestic central bank needs to abandon its fixed exchange rate policy, 
12 It means that Pr(5' > S) under both foreign fixed and flexible exchange rate policy equal to zero. 
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increasing realignment cost keeps motivating the domestic central bank to provide 
more financial aid at this region. However, once c , 
Domestic D 
realignment cost of the domestic central bank is high enough to make fixed 
exchange rate policy a dominant strategy of the domestic central bank. Removing 
the threat of competitive devaluations, there is a jump in the minimum financial aid 
requested by the foreign central bank. The maximum financial aid that will be 
provided by the domestic central bank, however, start decreasing with the increasing 
domestic realignment cost and finally below the level required to keep the foreign 
central bank at the cooperative equilibrium. The illustrative example shows that an 
intermediate instead of high domestic realignment cost helps to sustain a cooperative 
equilibrium through financial aid. 
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6. Concluding Remarks 
Existing studies mainly focus on the cause of currency crises but seldom take 
financial aid into consideration. Interrelationship between the exchange rate 
policies of central banks described in Kasa and Huh (2001) is only the first half of 
the story. As long as negative impact of another currency's devaluation on the 
social loss of domestic economy is noted, central banks must try to avoid it to obtain 
constrained maximization. Financial aid is one of the solutions. 
Actually, financial aid is an important tool for a group of central banks to 
minimize the group's social loss. Financial aid channels social loss of a central 
bank with lower realignment cost to another central bank with higher realignment 
cost, which enables countries within a group to defend the cooperative equilibrium 
from a larger size of speculative attack. It explains the formation of numerous 
regional and international organizations aim at promoting financial stability, either 
regionally or globally. The most recent development is that China, South Korea, 
Japan and other members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have 
agreed to create a pool of US$80 billion to help protecting stability of members' 
currenc ies i3 . 
Unfortunately, this paper reveals financial aid may fails to defend the 
cooperative equilibrium in some cases. Obviously, relatively large size of 
speculative attack comparing with the realignment cost of the financial aid provider 
can be one case. In this case, the financial aid provider choose to fall into 
13 Japan, S. Korea, China Mull $80 Billion Reserve Pool, Bloomberg News, 4 May 2008 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080&sid=awCGhWbRKOXY) 
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competitive devaluations instead of providing sufficient financial aid to help the 
other central bank to defend its currency. May be more surprisingly, high 
realignment cost of the financial aid provider does not guarantee a successful 
cooperation as well. Such high realignment cost makes the fixed exchange rate 
policy a dominant strategy to the financial aid provider, sheltering its social loss 
from the impact of realignment cost and thus preventing it to provide more financial 
aid. 
Special features of the game, the multiple critical values for the domestic 
bank's policy response and the effect of the ‘‘weakest link" in defending a country's 
fixed exchange rate may shed light on future study. The model and games in this 
paper is highly stylized and much further work can be done to extend the model, for 
example, central banks with asymmetric tradeoff. Surely this paper is not the 
whole and prefect story for exchange rate policy coordination in financial forms but 
hopefully, it can arouse interest in future study. 
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8. Appendix 
8.1. Change in Price Level and Exchange Rate 
Given that domestic price level of country i (P,) is composed of both prices of 
domestic goods (Pd) and imported goods (Pf) in the following form: 
广 = 々 户 / , 
where p is the share of imported goods in the domestic consumption of country i and 
P, = , 
/V 
where is the is the direct quote of the country z's currency and P^： is the price of 
imported goods in foreign currency. From this, 
p,:P))-P、EJ>,Y 
log P, = (1 - /?) log P丨)+ P log E, + p log P,. 
d\ogP, 们 " l o g 户 / ) 丨严 g E , I dlogP, 
dt dt dt dt 
dlogP, dP丨 d\ogP丨)dP丨)I d\ogE, dE丨 I dlogP, dP, 
dP丨 dt _ dP丨)dt dE, dt dP, dt 
A 




8.2. Optimization of Depreciation Rate 
Putting (3) and (4) into (1), 
To minimize loss with depreciation rate of its currency, country i should 
么 = 0 
de丨 
a{e, -e 丨、-y]a + ye丨=0 
(a^ + = a^e、^ocy 
ocy + a^e 丨 
e, = 2 
a + Y 
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8.3. Social Loss for Unilateral Devaluation 
Putting (3) and (4) into (1) with Ci as (7) and 
1 厂广 、 12 / \2 
^ 1 a _ 7 a — 
Li 仅 — 少 一 少 + - — ^ 少 
2|_ V ^ + / J 」 j 
「 - 1 2 「 一 
—丄 7 - 丄一2 Q ^ V 
= 尸 2 + 
‘ 2 + / ) ' +y)\ 
Li 二 ： ^ / 
2 + r j 
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8.4. Social Loss under Foreign Unilateral Devaluation 
Putting (3) and (4) into (1) with and Cj as (7), 
1厂广 A f 
r 1 OC - _ 
L, cc 一““-少 
W GC +y ) _ 
厂 l 2 
, 1 a ' _ _ 
L, 二 ； -Y^y + y 
2 a + / 
,1_2〔1 ) 
2 Of' + r ) 
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8.5. Social Loss for Competitive Devaluations 
Putting ei=ej in (7), 
a y a^e, 
e = — — - + — 
/ 2 2 
a + Y a + Y 
ye, = o y 
a^ + / a^ + y 
a _ 
e, = -y 
r 
(X — 
Putting (3) and (4) into (1) with 二e! 
y 
1 f • 
, 1—2 r « — 
2 2、/ J 
, 1 — 2 1 - 2 
L, =-y +-y —— 
L, 1 + — 
I / J 
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8.6. Impact ofcp on )! 
Differentiation of (20): 
d [1 + � 
丁 -y - — — + 
a(p 2 + ) 
1 -J，f 1 + 2 \ + 2(p ] 1� 
=—y s 1 — 1 > 
2 L 、 儿 ( 1 + < ? 0 2 」 
二丄歹 2 [ 1 ± _ 4 ! -
2 k^^y _ 
"2 [1 + ,1 、 
却 2 2 ^ 1 + ^  j 
_ 1 - ^ r 4 3(2 + V ) 
= 1 + j < 0 
(1 +识广 
Value of (p that maximize (20): 
d 1_2�1 + 2(^)2 
少 z - ( 1 + 二 0 
ci(p 2 \ \ + (p ) 
丄歹 —1 口 
2 ” ( � + —3 J 
2 + A(p = {\ + 
(p、+3(^2 -(p- \ - 0 
.-.(^ = 0.675 
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8.7. Optimization Benefit under different foreign policy 
A, - A' 
1 f 2 A 1 IV 2、 
1 _ 2 a 1 _ 2 L a L a \ 
2 、^^ y a +y) y Y ) 
1 [V 1 、 f 2 、 2 广 2 、 -
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二一少 一 1 — — - 1 + ^ — — + 1 + — — 
2 j I a 、 r } 
1 r 2 广 2 A { 2 、2 
1 _2 a a a 
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+ y) 
1 -2[ 2/ 2 V 2 ( 2 、 4 
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8.8. The Complete Two-Country Game with Financial Aid 
1. Speculative Attack on the Foreign 
Central Bank 
2." Frnahcral "Aid 
Provide Z No Decision of the 
Financial ^ ^ \F inanc i a l Aid Domestic 
/ Central Bank 
八 - V - 3： Foreign 
Accept and / NReject and / \ Exchange Rate 
/ \ Fixed / f lexible 
Keep Fixed / Change to / \ Policy 
/ F l ^ i b l e / \ Decision 
.L 入 八 V 47 Dbmestfc 
/ \ \ \ / \ Exchange Rate 
Fixed/ F lk ib le Fi^ cecj/ F lk ib le Fix沟 Flexible Fixstl F lk ib le 
7 \ / \ 7 \ 7 \ Policy Decision 
Payoff: 
D: Eq.24 Eq.30 Eq. l6 Eq. l3 Eq.l5 Eq. l2 Eq. l6 Eq.l3 
F: Eq.25 Eq.31 Eq. l2 Eq.l3 Eq.l5 Eq. l6 Eq. l2 Eq.l3 
Figure 6 — The complete two-country game with financial aid. 
Social loss function for unilateral devaluation with financial aid is: 
1 ( \ 
丄 + C , +For l f +F. (30) 
2 ^ y ) 
Social loss for maintaining fixed exchange rate under foreign unilateral devaluation 
with financial aid is: 
. / 2 y 
丄歹2 i + _ +5； - F o r I f - F . (31 ) 
2 ct + r j 
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